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CUTTING DOWN DAMAGES
AWARDS IN TIMBER TRESPASS
CASES
Dana M. Diehr*
ABSTRACT
The Alaska Supreme Court recently heard two cases addressing damages
awards for timber trespass claims. Both cases, Wiersum v. Harder and
Chung v. Park, emphasized the difficulty of obtaining restoration damages
and the close scrutiny given to the size of the damages award itself. This Note
explores the history of timber trespass and the current method by which
courts determine the appropriate damages award. The Note also proposes a
possible alternative to the current reticence toward restoration damages in
which the plaintiff may elect to receive restoration damages but would be
required to use those damages to restore their trees.

INTRODUCTION
A.

A Timber Trespass Hypothetical

You own a plot of land in the Matanuska-Susitna Valley, on which
you have built a cabin overlooking a river and enveloped by numerous
mature Sitka spruce trees. Work and family obligations keep you busy
during the week but you sneak out to the cabin every weekend to
unwind. In five years, when you retire, you hope to move to the cabin
full-time to be surrounded by nature.
Marring this idyllic vision is your contentious relationship with
your neighbor, Ms. McAdams. Her plot overlooks your land, which sits
between hers and the river. Some of your tall trees partially block
McAdams’ view of the water. Annoyed, McAdams hires men to cut
down the tallest of your trees to create a panoramic view for her cabin.
You are outraged by the loss of trees because their beauty was one of the
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reasons for your purchase of the land. When you consult a nursery
about replacing the trees, the arborist tells you that shipping in mature
spruce trees would cost $25,000.
How much of this cost should be borne by Ms. McAdams? It seems
to you that she should pay the whole $25,000 cost to replace the trees she
cut down. But what if, putting your sadness aside, your land’s fair
market value has gone down only $5,000 or has not decreased at all as a
result of McAdams’s behavior? In fact, it’s possible that your plot is
actually worth more with the trees removed. Under that circumstance, is
it still fair to make McAdams pay the $25,000? Or is it unfair to make
you bear the cost of planting replacement trees yourself because the fair
market price does not accurately capture the value your spruce trees
added to the land?
This hypothetical involving the destruction of trees on the property
of another was traditionally covered by the common-law tort of
trespass.1 However, in Alaska and several other states, statutes create an
alternative cause of action for such cases.2
One of the earliest cases in the United States regarding timber
trespass is E.E. Bolles Wooden-Ware Company v. United States,3 in which
the Supreme Court grappled with the valuation of felled trees.4 Courts
today still struggle to determine the appropriate amount of damages in
timber trespass cases because the costs of restoring mature trees often
outweigh the land’s diminution in market value.
B.

Alaska’s Timber Trespass Statute

The state of Alaska quickly recognized timber trespass claims in its
courts. The timber trespass statute, Alaska Statute § 09.45.730, was
enacted in 1962.5 Though there had been cases involving the destruction
or removal of timber under common-law trespass claims before Alaska’s
statehood,6 the earliest case to reach the Alaska Supreme Court under

1. ERIC M. LARSSON, Causes of Action for Damages Resulting from Timber
Trespass, § 2, in 45 CAUSES OF ACTION (2d ed. 2010).
2. Id.
3. 106 U.S. 432 (1882).
4. See id. at 433. Trespassers intentionally cut and removed trees on
plaintiff’s land. After being felled, the trees on the ground had a value of only
about $60. Id. However, the trespassers carried the trees a long distance to town,
where the timber was purchased for $850. Id. The Court determined that $850
was the correct valuation of the timber, in part because an award of the lesser
amount would encourage trespassers to continue to cut and abscond with
timber. Id. at 433–36.
5. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.730 (1988).
6. E.g., Duffy v. Strandberg, 5 Alaska 353 (D. Alaska 1915); McQuilan v.
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the timber trespass statute was Mertz v. J.M. Covington Corporation in
1970.7 The current version of the timber trespass statute reads:
A person who without lawful authority cuts down, girdles, or
otherwise injures or removes a tree, timber, or a shrub on (1)
the land of another person or on the street or highway in front
of a person’s house, or (2) a village or municipal lot, or
cultivated grounds, or the commons or public land of a village
or municipality, or (3) the street or highway in front of land
described in (2) of this section, is liable to the owner of that
land, or to the village or municipality for treble the amount of
damages that may be assessed in a civil action. However, if the
trespass was unintentional or involuntary, or the defendant
had probable cause to believe that the land on which the
trespass was committed was the defendant’s own or that of the
person in whose service or by whose direction the act was
done, or where the timber was taken from unenclosed
woodland for the purpose of repairing a public highway or
bridge on or adjoining the land, only actual damages may be
recovered.8
C.

Other States’ Statutes

Other than Alaska, forty-two states also have statutes relating to
timber trespass.9 A Missouri court suggested that separate statutory
timber trespass actions beyond common-law trespass are necessary
because “[s]tatutory trespass attempts to redress plaintiff for injuries
that often have intangible qualities, such as aesthetic value, and such
damages are often difficult to measure.”10 While many states’ statutes
resemble Alaska’s in focusing on the destruction and removal of trees,
some states have enacted statutes targeting the impermissible
destruction or removal of various natural resources, including trees.
Although discussion of each of these states’ statutes is beyond the scope

Tanana Elec. Co., 3 Alaska 110 (D. Alaska 1906).
7. 470 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1970).
8. § 09.45.730.
9. LARSSON, supra note 1, § 37. The forty-two states are: Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
10. Hale v. Warren, 236 S.W.3d 687, 695 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
Ridgway v. TTnT Dev. Corp., 26 S.W.3d 428, 435–36 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
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of this Note, the Washington and Oregon statutes deserve greater
attention because of the shared Pacific Northwestern environmental
context of Alaska, Washington, and Oregon.
Oregon’s statute applies to trespasses that result in damage to or
destruction of trees, produce, or other vegetation.11 Like Alaska’s statute,
it allows for the collection of treble damages in cases where the trespass
was committed “willfully, intentionally and without plaintiff’s
consent.”12 Washington’s statute13 applies to natural resources more
generally than either Alaska’s or Oregon’s statutes; it covers timber,
crops, minerals, and any other valuable resource from the land.14 A
separate statute,15 which addresses only the destruction or removal of
timber, specifies that any award for timber trespass is subject to treble
damages, regardless of defendant’s knowledge or intent.16
It is no surprise that these states have enacted statutes to protect
trees on private lands, as economic and environmental issues
surrounding timber loom large in the Pacific Northwest’s public
discourse. Alaska has enormous forests scattered across the state for a
total of 129 million forested acres.17 Unsurprisingly, Alaska is home to
the two largest national forests in the United States.18 There are boreal
forests throughout Alaska’s interior and southern central region.19 Along
the southeast, there are coastal rainforests like those in Washington and
Oregon.20 Meanwhile, in Oregon and Washington alone, there are
sixteen national forests that attract large numbers of tourists.21 For the
Pacific Northwest, careful stewardship of the region’s timber resources

11. OR. REV. STAT § 105.810(1) (2014).
12. Id.
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.630 (1999).
14. Id.
15. § 64.12.030 (2011).
16. Id.
17. Alaska Forest Facts, ALASKA FOREST ASS’N, http://www.akforest.org/
facts.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
18. The Tongass National Forest is the largest national forest in the United
States, while the Chugach National Forest is the second largest. Id.
19. Id. (“The forests found in Alaska’s interior are known as Boreal Forests.
These forests extend from the Kenai Peninsula to the Tanana Valley near
Fairbanks, and as far north as the foothills of the Brooks Range. They stretch
from the Porcupine River near the Canadian border and west down the
Kuskokwim River valley.”).
20. Id. (“The coastal rainforest begins in southern southeast Alaska, and
extends through Prince William Sound, and down the Kenai Peninsula to [the]
Afognak and Kodiak Islands.”).
21. The U.S. Forest Service highlights the beauty of these sixteen Pacific
Northwestern forests in its tourism video. Visit Your Pacific Northwest National
Forest, Pacific Northwest Region, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV.,
http://www.fs.usda.gov/r6 (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
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is important for the local economy, environment, and identity.22 In
Oregon and Washington, the logging industry has been cut back in
order to protect the region’s sensitive environment.23
The timber industry remains an important part of Alaska’s
economy.24 Recently, however, environmentalists have lobbied and filed
lawsuits to curb logging in the Tongass National Forest.25 The Forest
Service in Alaska is trying to balance the tension between the
conservation of forests and the economic benefit the timber industry
provides.

I. MECHANICS OF DAMAGES AWARD CALCULATIONS
A.

Compensatory Damages based on Diminution of Fair Market
Value

At trial, the amount of damages for most timber trespass claims
equates to the diminution of the land’s fair market value as a result of
the trespass.26 Although Alaska has not yet calculated damages this way,
at least one other state court has held that the value of the lost timber
itself can be recovered in addition to the diminution in fair market value
of the land.27
In order to determine the loss of fair market value, testimony by

22. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGION
ALMANAC 1, https://fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5378417
.pdf (“These [public lands, including National Forests] provide the people and
communities of the Pacific Northwest their livelihood, recreation, visual
backdrop, and identity.”).
23. Id. (“The wetter west-slope vegetation zones were aggressively logged
during the last few decades. Timber harvest has declined substantially due to
environmental and Threatened, Endangered, and Sensitive (TE&S) species
concerns.”).
24. Alaska Forest Facts, supra note 17 (“Today, Alaska’s forest products
industry provides hundreds of jobs and contributes millions of dollars to
Alaska’s economy. Furthermore, each direct timber job creates at least three
indirect jobs for doctors, retailers, teachers, and more.”).
25. Michael Wines, In Alaska’s Tongass, a Battle to Keep Trees or an Industry,
Standing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2014, at A22 (“Environmental groups filed three
lawsuits against the Forest Service last month. Perhaps the most significant of
them contends that further logging threatens an already struggling Alaskan
wolf, defying a federal law requiring the service to protect wildlife on its
lands.”).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1979).
27. LARSSON, supra note 1, § 22 (“At least one court has held that it is
possible to recover statutory damages for the value of timber removed, plus a
diminution in value of the land if there is identifiable loss separate from the
removal of the timber.”) (citing Sells v. Robinson, 118 P.3d 99, 107 (Idaho 2005)).

ARTICLE 4 - DIEHR (DO NOT DELETE)

104

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

6/14/2016 2:03 PM

[33:1

both the landowner and experts is admissible.28 “In Alaska, lay
testimony offered by the landowner as to property value is admissible
because of the owner’s presumed knowledge about the value of such
property.”29 Additionally, real estate agents familiar with the property
and the neighboring area can provide expert testimony on the
diminution of the land’s fair market value.30
B.

Statutory Treble Damages

Many plaintiff landowners are not limited to recovery of actual
damages because Alaska Statute section 09.45.730 allows for recovery of
treble damages in timber trespass cases, with three exceptions.31 Treble
damages punish defendants for intentionally removing trees from
another’s property, and thereby discourage them from committing
timber trespass again.32
There is an exception for unintentional trespasses that result in
damage to plaintiff landowner’s trees.33 One example would be an
unintentional fire on the defendant’s property, which spreads to the
plaintiff’s land and destroys his trees. For unintentional or involuntary
trespasses, treble damages would fail to discourage future trespasses by
the defendant, because the forces behind these trespasses, such as fires,
are difficult to predict and control.
Treble damages are also not awarded where the defendant had
probable cause to believe that his destruction or removal of plaintiff’s
trees was permissible.34 Here, probable cause means “an honest and
reasonable belief” that the defendant had the “authority to enter and cut
on the property.”35 Because a reasonable belief is required for probable

28. See Osborne v. Hurst, 947 P.2d 1356, 1361–62 (Alaska 1997).
29. Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281, 286 (Alaska 1983) (citing
Wernberg v. Matanuska Elec. Ass’n, 494 P.2d 790, 795 (Alaska 1972)).
30. See Osborne, 947 P.2d at 1362. The court allowed the expert testimony of
a “certified residential specialist” and “certified residential broker” familiar with
the plaintiff’s lot and neighborhood. Id. The expert had explained that “her job
require[d] her to be familiar with the value of real property and that she [was]
frequently asked to give ‘a fair market value or a fair estimation value’ of
property.” Id.
31. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.730 (1988).
32. LARSSON, supra note 1, § 24 (“Generally, the recovery of statutory
damages multipliers is regarded as a substitute for punitive damages for the
intentional or knowing removal of agricultural products from the land of
another, and it follows that it is improper to award both treble damages and
punitive damages against a defendant for the destruction of such products.”).
33. Matanuska Elec. Ass’n v. Weissler, 723 P.2d 600, 608 (Alaska 1986).
34. E.g., id.
35. Id.
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cause, a defendant who cuts down another’s trees because of a negligent
mistaken belief that he had permission lacks “probable cause.”36 In such
cases, treble damages would be unduly punitive on less culpable
defendants who had no intention of trespassing on the plaintiff’s
property.
However, even if the timber trespass did not fall within one of the
three exceptions, courts may only award treble damages if the plaintiff
demands them in his complaint.37 If the plaintiff does request treble
damages in the pleadings, then the defendant bears the burden of
proving that his actions fell within one of the three exceptions.38
C.

Restoration Damages

While damages based on the diminution of fair market value are
the norm, courts in Alaska may award restoration damages in certain
cases. The Alaska Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 929 approach for determining damages in trespass claims.39
Section 929 reads in relevant part:
(1) If one is entitled to a judgment for harm to land resulting
from a past invasion and not amounting to a total destruction
of value, the damages include compensation for
(a) the difference between the value of the land before the
harm and the value after the harm, or at his election in an
appropriate case, the cost of restoration that has been or
may be reasonably incurred.40
Because restoration damages would be inappropriate in cases
where the land could not be restored, restoration damages are only
awarded when the harm to the land is not “fixed and irreparable.”41
In determining whether restoration damages are appropriate,
Alaska courts look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929, Comment
(b).42 Comment (b) advises that disproportionately large restoration
damages are only appropriate when the landowner has a “reason
36. Id. (“Here, [defendant]’s negligence ‘verg[ing] on recklessness’ negates
any probable cause to cut the affected trees. [Defendant]’s negligence in
believing it could cut the trees made its mistake unreasonable. The probable
cause exclusion will not limit [defendant]’s liability.”).
37. McQuillan v. Tanana Elec. Co., 3 Alaska 110, 112 (D. Alaska 1906).
38. Weissler, 723 P.2d at 604–05.
39. See G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379,
1385–86 (Alaska 1974) (applying the Restatement approach).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1979).
41. G & A Contractors, Inc., 517 P.2d at 1386.
42. Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282, 288 (Alaska 1981).
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personal” to him that justifies the expense of restoration.43 As an
example, Comment (b) provides that “when a garden has been
maintained in a city in connection with a dwelling house, the owner is
entitled to recover the expense of putting the garden in its original
condition even though the market value of the premises has not been
decreased by the defendant’s invasion.”44 In Andersen v. Edwards,45 the
Alaska Supreme Court wrote,
We believe the appropriate rule is that if the cost of restoring
the land to its original condition is disproportionate to the
diminution in the value of the land caused by the trespass, the
restoration measure of damages is inappropriate unless there is
a ‘reason personal to the owner’ for restoring the original
condition.46
There is no set method of deciding whether there is a sufficient
reason personal to the plaintiff that justifies restoration damages. Rather,
there are multiple factors about the land and its owners that should be
considered at trial, with none of the factors being necessarily dispositive.
The Alaska Pattern Jury Instructions § 13.05 for Trespass Damages
informs jurors:
To determine whether there is a reason personal to the plaintiff
for restoring the property, you may consider the nature of the
property, how it was used, the likelihood that the plaintiff

43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 cmt. b. Comment (b) reads in part:
Even in the absence of value arising from personal use, the reasonable
cost of replacing the land in its original position is ordinarily allowable
as the measure of recovery. Thus if a ditch is wrongfully dug upon the
land of another, the other normally is entitled to damages measured by
the expense of filling the ditch, if he wishes it filled. If, however, the
cost of replacing the land in its original condition is disproportionate to
the diminution in the value of the land caused by the trespass, unless
there is a reason personal to the owner for restoring the original
condition, damages are measured only by the difference between the
value of the land before and after the harm. This would be true, for
example, if in trying the effect of explosives, a person were to create
large pits upon the comparatively worthless land of another.
Id.

44. Id. However, some other jurisdictions may award disproportionate
restoration damages whether or not the plaintiff has a “reason personal,” if an
award of diminution of fair market value would be unjust. See B.A. Mortg. Co. v.
McCullough, 590 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (holding that the
particular facts of the case warranted deviation from the standard fair market
value damages calculation in order to prevent defendants from evading liability
for the unlawful re-gradation of plaintiff’s land).
45. Andersen, 625 P.2d at 282.
46. Id. at 288.
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would actually restore it, or any other factors you think are
important.47
Given this nebulous factors test, a close examination of timber
trespass cases in which restoration damages were demanded provides
the most insight into what generally qualifies as a “reason personal” to
the plaintiff. In Andersen v. Edwards, the court found that the plaintiff
lacked a reason for requesting restoration damages.48 The defendant, a
development corporation, wrongfully cut more trees than necessary on a
section line easement through plaintiff’s land in order to build a public
road.49 The plaintiff expressed his concern to the defendant about the
possible destruction of trees on his land before construction of the road
began. The defendant assured the plaintiff that the construction “would
do as little damage to the area as possible”; nevertheless, defendant
cleared almost the entire one hundred foot width of the easement,
despite the road’s much smaller twenty-five foot width.50
After the jury awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in restoration damages,
the defendant appealed.51 The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, holding
that “the trial court erred in using the cost of restoration as the measure
of damages in this case.”52 The court determined that the destroyed trees
did not possess “beauty, location, quality, size or other particular
features” that would make them “of peculiar value to the landowner.”53
The court concluded that the lack of reason personal to the plaintiff to
restore the trees made it unlikely that the plaintiff would use the
damages to actually restore the land.54
In Osborne v. Hurst,55 the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the
court should have considered whether the plaintiffs, a married couple,
possessed a “reason personal” that justified restoration.56 The court
remanded for a jury trial because sufficient evidence existed to support

47. Trespass Damages, in ALASKA CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 13.05
(1996).
48. Andersen, 625 P.2d at 288–89.
49. Id. at 284.
50. Id. at 285.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 288.
53. Id. at 289. Therefore, “[t]he severed trees were without special value
beyond the fact that they were located on the [defendant]’s property . . . .
Consequently, we hold that the diminution in value of the property or the
economic value of the timber cut was the appropriate measure of damages.” Id.
54. Id.
55. 947 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Alaska 1997).
56. Osborne, 947 P.2d at 1360.
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the finding of a reason personal to the plaintiffs by a jury.57 The plaintiffs
testified in depositions that they bought their property because of “its
unique views, its abundant trees, and the unusual juxtaposition of the
trees, the cabin, and the views.”58 In addition to claiming that none of
the nearby properties were comparable, the plaintiffs stated that they
intended to use their property as their primary residence after
retirement.59 Thus, the plaintiffs’ special circumstances might have
convinced a jury that a restoration damages award disproportionate to
the land’s diminution of fair market value was reasonable.60
Likewise, in G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc.,61 the
Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff landowner “use[d] its
property for purposes peculiar to its business” and “therefore
restoration [was] necessary.”62 The plaintiff, Alaska Greenhouses, Inc.,
owned a thirty-acre parcel of land, through which a creek ran
downstream from the defendant’s land.63 This land was used for the
operation of a horticulture business.64 The plaintiff wanted the property
to be a “garden showplace” for his business, as well as a “recreation
area” and arboretum.65
The defendant, G & A Contractors, Inc., owned a fifty-three acre
land parcel, through which the creek also ran.66 It intended to develop
its property into a multi-family housing development.67 The defendant
needed to divert the creek running through the property in order to
develop the land.68 During the excavation of land to divert the creek,
“heavy earthmoving equipment” hired by the defendant trespassed on
plaintiff’s land numerous times.69 These trespasses resulted in
“extensive damage to trees and ground cover” on plaintiff’s property.70
This damage prevented the plaintiff from using its property to
display the variety and quality of trees and other plants available
through its nursery business.71 The total damages award against the

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
517 P.2d 1379 (Alaska 1974).
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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defendant was $15,661.25, of which $12,555 was attributable to the
destruction of various trees and vegetation.72 Defendant argued that the
award of restoration damages for the destroyed trees and vegetation
was unreasonable and that diminution of fair market value was the
better measure of damages.73 However, the Alaska Supreme Court was
not persuaded because the defendant did not prove that the damages
amount was clearly erroneous or unreasonable in light of the trial
court’s finding that plaintiff had a sufficient reason personal to restore
its property.74 Because maintaining the trees on its land was necessary
for Alaska Greenhouses, to continue its business, the court held that the
plaintiff had a personal reason warranting restoration damages.75

II. RECENT CASES
A.

Timber Trespass Claims in Alaska

Although there have been a limited number of timber trespass
claims in Alaska,76 two recent Alaska Supreme Court cases highlight the
dual difficulties these claims encounter: determining whether the
plaintiff has a genuine “reason personal” and determining what amount
of restoration damages would be “objectively reasonable.”
B.

Wiersum v. Harder

In Wiersum v. Harder,77 the plaintiff-respondent, Paul Harder, filed a
timber trespass claim against defendants Darlene and Joel Wiersum

72. Id. at 1382.
73. Id. at 1385–86. Interestingly, defendant argued that diminution of fair
market value of the land was the more appropriate measure of damages because
the damage to plaintiff’s land was “permanent.” Id. at 1386. However, defendant
presented no evidence that the injury to the land was permanent, which would
have made planting new trees futile. Id. Furthermore, defendant failed to show
the trial court’s finding on restoration damages was clearly erroneous. Id.
74. Id. at 1386.
75. Id. at 1382, 1385.
76. Since its inception in 1962, only eleven cases under the statute have
reached the Alaska Supreme Court. See Chung v. Rora Park, 339 P.3d 351
(Alaska 2014); Wiersum v. Harder, 316 P.3d 557 (Alaska 2013); Hayes v. A.J.
Assocs., Inc., 960 P.2d 556 (Alaska 1998); Osborne v. Hurst, 947 P.2d 1356
(Alaska 1997); Matanuska Electric Ass’n v. Wissler, 723 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1986);
Shane v. Rhines, 672 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1983); Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282
(Alaska 1981); Scavenius v. City of Anchorage, 539 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1975);
Mertz v. J. M. Covington Corp., 470 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1970); Rohaley v. Compere,
2004 WL 2260293, No. S–11004, at *1 (Oct. 6, 2004); Coffel v. Larsen, 1988 WL
1514913, No. S–2186, at *1 (Sept. 28, 1988).
77. 316 P.3d 557 (Alaska 2013).
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after the Wiersums cut numerous trees on plaintiff’s land.78 Harder
bought land in Kodiak in 1976, on which he built a small house he lived
in for a number of years.79 Later, in 1982, he “subdivided the property
into three lots: Lots 1A, 1B, and 1C.”80 The house stood on Lot 1B, which
plaintiff sold to his sister, Lisa Wietfeld, in 1993.81 Although he lived
outside of Alaska for the next fifteen years, Harder visited the property
frequently and intended to build a cabin on Lot 1A “in the old growth
forest for his retirement.”82
The Wiersums then bought their property, which was adjacent to
Lot 1A and also overlooked Lot 1B.83 Because the Wiersums could view
Wietfeld’s cabin on Lot 1B, they believed Wietfeld owned all the
property between Lot 1A and Lot 1B.84 In 2005, the Wiersums asked
Wietfeld if they could cut down some trees on her property that might
“‘come down with the wind’ and harm their property.”85 Wietfeld
consented at the time but became upset when she saw that they had
cleared the entire hillside, rather than removing a few potentially
dangerous trees.86 In 2007, Harder visited the property again and
discovered that the clear-cut hillside was on his land, and not Wietfeld’s
Lot 1B.87
Harder filed a timber trespass claim against the Wiersums in early
2008.88 He sought restoration costs as well as statutory treble damages
under Alaska Stat. § 09.45.730.89 The Wiersums argued in their answer
that any liability should be apportioned between themselves and
Wietfeld, and that statutory treble damages were inappropriate because
they had probable cause for believing that Wietfeld owned all the
property and had given them permission to cut down Harder’s trees.90
The trial began in May 2010, during which both parties testified
and presented expert testimony as to the costs of restoration.91 While
Harder admitted that the property’s value of $27,500 had not been

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 559.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 561–62.
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diminished due to the loss of trees,92 he testified that he wanted to
restore the trees on Lot 1A because:
As a boy, he had hiked across the property with his friends
while hunting and fishing. He lived in the house that he had
built on Lot 1B for several years. Even after he moved out of
Alaska, he continued to fish in Kodiak in the summers and
periodically spent time at the Monashka property with his
family. He testified that he held on to the Monashka property
for 34 years and that he intended to build a house and live on
Lot 1A once his son graduated from college.93
Furthermore, Harder testified that Lot 1A was a particularly
beautiful and private area of the property because “the tall trees
screened the neighboring houses from view.”94 Disturbed by the
property’s loss of beauty and privacy following the trespass, he declared
on the stand “It’s been . . . altered forever, and all I’m asking is that it’s
repaired . . . I mean, I don’t want money. I want my trees back.”95
In order to prove Harder’s intention to restore the land, he
“testif[ied] to and submit[ted as] evidence a purported notarized
‘contract’” to the jury.96 In the “contract” with the jurors, he promised
that all restoration damages would be used solely to replant trees similar
to those the Wiersums had destroyed.97 On appeal, the Wiersums
argued that the jury should not have been allowed to consider the
“contract,” as it in no way legally bound Harder to actually restore his
land with the damages award.98 As will be discussed in greater detail
below, the court agreed, noting that the jury could easily have been
misled by the word “contract” and its implication of legal

92. Id. at 561.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (alteration in original).
96. Id. at 570–71.
97. Id. at 570. Harder’s proposed “contract” with the jurors read:
I Paul Harder do hereby solemnly swear, at the risk of being
prosecuted for fraud, to replant a minimum of 70 Sitka spruce trees and
no less than 6500 square feet of understory on Lot 1A block 8 Monashka
bay subdivision, if awarded restoration damages from the Harder
versus Wiersum[]s law suit. I Paul Harder agree to use all those
restoration damages solely for restoration and to plant the largest trees
that the award will afford . . . . Paul Harder agrees that restoration
damages shall be held in an escrow trust by his attorney Jill
Wittenbrader and doled out as needed to complete the job.
Id. at 573–74 (Carpeneti, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. Id. at 571.
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enforceability.99 The court ruled that this evidence was inadmissible and
could not be considered in the determination of damages upon
remand.100
Following his own testimony, Harder presented the expert
testimony of a forester, an arborist, and a horticulturist to establish the
cost of restoration.101 The forester noted that almost seventy trees had
been cut on Harder’s property.102 To transplant seventy nine to ten foot
tall sitka spruce trees, Harder’s arborist estimated that it would cost
$161,000.103 In addition, the arborist testified that another $162,000
would be necessary to replace the property’s lost ground cover.104 Using
a different technique for the transplantation of large trees, the
horticulturist believed it would cost an astonishing $620,537 to restore
plaintiff’s land.105
The Wiersums testified about their mistaken belief that they had
permission from Wietfeld to cut down the trees on Lot 1A, which they
believed she owned.106 A real estate expert testified that Harder’s
property in 2005 had a listing value of $30,000–$40,000 and that its value
would only have been “minimally affected, if at all,” by the lost trees.107
Finally, defendants’ arborist testified that restoration of Harder’s
property would cost approximately $34,000.108 But this arborist
suggested the transplantation of smaller Sitka pines from nearby areas
of Kodiak than Harder’s experts suggested; furthermore, the arborist

99. Id. Furthermore:
Because contracts are widely recognized to be legally enforceable
agreements, proposing such a ‘contract’ with the jurors was likely to
have misled jurors into believing that Harder’s promise to restore his
property was legally enforceable when it was not. The jury’s decision
on the proper amount of damages could thus have been impermissibly
influenced by a false belief that Harder was legally bound to use a
damage award to restore his property.
Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 561.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. In total, the arborist’s restoration strategy would have cost $323,000.
Id.
105. Id. Thus, the horticulturist’s restoration plan would cost almost double
that of the arborist.
106. Id. However, “they admitted that they did not check public records to
verify ownership” of the property. Id. This undercut the reasonableness of their
mistake.
107. Id. at 561. Additionally, defendants’ real estate expert noted that
Harder’s property had appreciated to a value of $50,000–$55,000 by 2009 despite
the lack of trees. Id.
108. Id. at 562.
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included some additional funds to compensate for very tall trees that
could not be replaced easily.109 The arborist stated “his restoration plan
specifically took into account [Harder]’s interest in restoring the privacy
that his property had previously enjoyed.”110
Upon concluding their defense, the Wiersums requested a motion
for a directed verdict on the theory that Harder could not prove there
had been a diminution in the property’s fair market value.111 They also
argued that the restoration cost estimates presented during trial were all
unreasonable because they were disproportionate given the lack of a
diminished fair market value.112 But the trial judge denied the motion.113
Instead, the jury deliberated and found that Harder had a sufficient
“reason personal” and would use any restoration damages to restore the
property.114 They awarded him $161,000 in compensatory damages and
found that he was entitled to statutory treble damages.115 The Wiersums
filed a motion requesting the trial judge grant a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), reprising their argument that “the
restoration cost damages awarded to the [plaintiff] are manifestly
unreasonable as a matter of law in light of the zero diminution in the
value of [plaintiff]’s property that resulted from the trees being cut.’”116
The trial court denied defendants’ motion and the Wiersums
appealed.117
On appeal, a majority of the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the
lower court by ruling that the $161,000 in restoration damages was
objectively unreasonable.118 But as Justice Stowers points out in the
dissent, the court here overtook the fact-finding responsibility of the jury
in order to substitute its own concept of reasonableness.119 When an

109. Id. Defendants’ arborist used the “trunk formula method” to determine
the value of the trees removed. Id. “This method determines the value of a lost
tree by first identifying the price of a replacement tree that is ‘the largest
common available size,’ and then measuring a cross-section of the lost tree and
extrapolating its price based on the price of the replacement tree. The arborist
testified that this method is used when it is not possible to replace exact trees
due to their size or their growth in a forested environment where their root
zones are intertwined.” Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 570.
119. Id. at 578 (Stowers, J., dissenting).
We have long relied on juries to serve as the quintessential collective
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Alaskan court reviews the denial of a JNOV motion by a trial court,
generally “the only evidence that should be considered is the evidence
favorable to the non-moving party . . . .”120 Yet, in this case, where
Harder’s experts testified that restoration of the trees could cost up to
$620,537, the court ruled that the much smaller damages award of
$161,000 reached by the jury was unreasonable.121
Also grappling with what constitutes reasonableness in restoration
awards, Chief Justice Fabe proposed an upper limit for the amount of
reasonable restoration damages in her concurrence.122 She concluded
that “compensatory damages to restore land based on a reason personal
should not ordinarily exceed the total value of the property prior to
trespass.”123 Because the restoration award of $161,000 was four times
the highest estimate for the land’s pre-trespass value ($40,000), Fabe
agreed with the majority that the restoration damages award was
unreasonable and additionally suggested that, upon remand, the
damages award should be capped at $40,000.124
C.

Chung v. Park

The most recent timber trespass case heard by the Alaska Supreme
Court, Chung v. Park,125 was decided on December 12, 2014. In this case,
plaintiff-landowner Rora Park filed a timber trespass claim against her
tenant Christopher Chung for clearing trees from her property without
permission.126
Around August 2007, Park leased a unit (Unit 13) on her property
to defendant.127 In exchange for a reduced rent, Chung agreed to make

‘reasonable’ person and entrusted them to make important factual
determinations. A jury of twelve did exactly that here and arrived at a
consensus after following proper jury instructions and evaluating
conflicting evidence, and yet the court holds their determination was
unreasonable. I disagree with this holding and therefore dissent from
the court’s decision to vacate the damages award and order a new trial
on damages.
Id.
120. Cameron v. Chang-Craft, 251 P.3d 1008, 1018 (Alaska 2011).
121. Wiersum, 316 P.3d at 577 (Stowers, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 571 (Fabe, C.J., concurring).
123. Id. at 572 (Fabe, C.J., concurring).
124. Id. at 571–72. In support of her proposed rule, Chief Justice Fabe cites a
Nebraska Supreme Court case, Keitges v. VanDerineulen, 483 N.W.2d 137 (Neb.
1992), in which the court ruled that restoration costs could only be recovered up
to the fair market value of the land before the trespass occurred. Id.
125. 339 P.3d 351 (Alaska 2014).
126. Chung, 339 P.3d at 353.
127. Id. at 352.
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improvement to the unit and a chapel that also stood on the property.128
Shortly thereafter, Chung purchased a lot (Lot 3) from Park adjacent to
the leased property.129
Chung had plans to build a house on Lot 3, for which he hired
Glacier Masonry and Excavation, Inc. (Glacier) in August 2008.130 One of
Glacier’s duties was to remove trees and vegetation from Chung’s lot.131
An employee of Glacier, Tracy, cleared vegetation in the power line
easement between Lot 3 and Park’s property while working on Lot 3.132
When Glacier’s owner advised Tracy that he was working beyond
Chung’s property and should work within Lot 3, Tracy responded “that
he was clearing out there to get a view, and that he’d been paid by
[Chung]” to do so.133 At that time, only between three and eight trees
had been removed from the easement or Park’s property.134
But, at trial, Park presented an expert who estimated that in total
“562 trees were cleared from about a third of an acre of [plaintiff]’s
property.”135 The trees that had been removed from Park’s property
appeared to be those that stood “more or less directly behind the house
built on [Chung]’s property,” presumably to create a better view.136 The
expert testified that the cost of restoring these trees would be “over
$400,000.”137 Despite this significant restoration cost, Chung’s expert
testified that Park’s property likely did not decrease in value as a result

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Aside from the Glacier owner’s testimony about Tracy’s clearing of
trees,
there was no direct evidence of who was responsible for removing the
trees from Park’s property. Park testified that she saw workers on her
property and that [defendant] told her that the workers cut the trees.
But Park did not personally see anyone remove trees from her
property. Although she suggested that [defendant] may have cleared
the trees so that he could see a nearby lake from his house, [defendant]
denied that his house had any view of the lake even after the trees were
cleared. Nevertheless, he offered no alternative explanation for the
trees’ disappearance.
Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. “Aerial photographs presented by the parties indicate that some trees
were removed from Park’s property near the border of Lot 3 between August
2008 and September 27, 2008, and more trees were removed between 2008 and
2009.” Id.
136. Id. Additionally, “[t]imber debris, presumably from the cleared trees,
was also discovered buried on Park’s property.” Id.
137. Id.
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of the trees’ removal.138
Park testified at trial that she possessed a “reason personal” that
would justify an award of restoration damages:
I have a previous history of cancer, and this natural beauty of
my yard is [a] healing spot for me, and . . . in the future I’m
going to [live] here, after [defendant] move[s] . . . . [A]fter work
I come by, see my property and see the natural beauty and the
trees and all that. [W]hen I [saw] that all cut out it just [made]
me very—[it] just [broke] my heart, and then very angry . . . . I
don’t know how [I can] explain . . . it’s just my healing natural
stop [sic]. [It] is just healing my health and [helping] me for
day-by-day living, and then when I saw that it just really hurt
my feeling[s] . . . .139
However, the trial court did not credit her testimony and found
that she had not established a “reason personal” for restoration
damages.140 Nevertheless, the trial court awarded restoration damages
for the lost trees in the amount of $23,500, as well as statutory treble
damages, stating that “‘it would be reasonable both aesthetically and
legally to award damages that would permit replacement of
trees . . . .”141
Defendant Chung appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, arguing
that the award of restoration damages was clearly erroneous because
plaintiff lacked a “reason personal” to restore the land and the
restoration damages were disproportionate given the lack of diminution
in fair market value of plaintiff Park’s property.142 Because the trial court
had explicitly found that Park did not have a “reason personal,” the
court ruled that restoration damages were inappropriate and vacated
the award of damages. Furthermore, the court remanded the case back
for the trial court to enter an award of only nominal damages because of
defendant’s intentional trespass.143

138. Id.
139. Id. at 354.
140. Id. The trial court was skeptical of Park’s testimony because she
“downplayed her visits to the property later in the trial.” Id.
141. Id. The $23,500 was the cost to restore fifty trees on Park’s property. Id.
So, with the statutory treble damages, her total damages recovery for the timber
trespass claim would have been $70,500.
142. Id. at 353.
143. Id. at 354.
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Implications

Wiersum and Chung imply that it is increasingly difficult to receive
restoration damages in timber trespass cases. These cases reveal judicial
skepticism and reticence toward awarding disproportionately large
restoration damages. In Chung, the trial court approached plaintiff
Park’s testimony under oath with great suspicion, refusing to accept her
avowal of personal attachment to the property as a sufficient reason
personal, even though the trial court still awarded her some restoration
damages. Although the plaintiff Harder in Wiersum presented
significant evidence of a “reason personal” that warranted an award of
restoration damages, the court displayed its distaste for outsized
restoration damages by rejecting the jury’s “unreasonable” restoration
award.
Thus, although Wiersum was technically a victory for the plaintiff
who was able to prove a “reason personal” and recover some restoration
damages, the case illustrates the difficulty of establishing just what
amount of restoration damages is “reasonable.” While the estimated
restoration costs presented by experts at trial seemed enormous, they
were the necessary expenses of restoring the land to its original
condition. In Wiersum, the jury chose the intermediate amount of
damages estimated to restore the plaintiff’s lost trees; in fact, the jury
awarded only half of the total restoration costs calculated by the
plaintiff’s arborist.144 Nevertheless, the court implied that planting
saplings and smaller trees is likely to be the most reasonable restoration
possible, even when the plaintiff has lost numerous large trees.145 The
majority wrote that “[i]n such cases, the achievement of a reasonable
approximation of the land’s former condition may involve something
less than substantially identical restoration . . . .”146 If that is the case,
then the court seems to believe that leaving plaintiffs who have suffered
an injury substantially less than “whole” is a reasonable resolution in
timber trespass cases.
Additionally, the Wiersum case quashes the unprecedented
“contract” method undertaken by the plaintiff. While the implication of
the “contract”—that plaintiff was legally bound to restore the
property—was potentially misleading, this ruling still underscores the
144. Wiersum v. Harder, 396 P.3d 557, 561 (Alaska 2013). The Harder’s’
arborist estimated that a total of $323,000 was necessary ($161,000 to restore the
trees and $162,000 to restore the ground cover). Id. However, the jury awarded
him only $161,000 for the restoration of the seventy trees. Id. at 562.
145. See id. at 570 (citing Heniger v. Dunn, 101 Cal. App. 3d 858, 866 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980)).
146. Id. (quoting Heniger, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 865).
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court’s distrust of plaintiffs who swear they will restore their land but
might pocket the money as a large windfall instead. If the testimony of
plaintiffs like those in Wiersum and Chung is insufficient to weed out
which land owners will actually restore their property, then how should
the courts determine which plaintiffs will likely use an award of
restoration damages to restore their land?

III. HOW SHOULD DAMAGES IN A TIMBER TRESPASS ACTION BE
CALCULATED?
The recent Alaska Supreme Court cases as well as other timber
trespass cases across the country reveal competing conceptions of what
makes the plaintiff “whole” after suffering loss as a result of another’s
trespass. An undercurrent in these opinions and the Restatement of
Torts (Second) discussion of restoration damages is that damages
awards need to be calculated differently, depending on the plaintiff’s
unique situation, in order to make the plaintiff “whole.” Thus, a plaintiff
who values her land primarily for the privacy and immersion with
nature it provides, like the plaintiff in Wiersum, requires restoration
damages in order to recover the element of the land she most valued.
But, for a developer or landlord who values his land primarily for the
income it may provide, damages in the amount of the land’s diminution
of fair market value sufficiently compensate him.147 While this

147. For example, Christopher E. Brown, Comment, Dump It Here, I Need the
Money: Restoration Damages For Temporary Injury to Real Property Held for Personal
Use, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 699, 699–700 (1996) (footnotes omitted) provides
an illustration of this intuitive difference:
After a long day, you come home to find that the construction crew at
the new homesite next door negligently drove a truck through the back
yard of your dream house. The truck left deep ruts in the soil and
destroyed all of your prized ornamental Japanese shrubs. The injury is
temporary and restorable. Fully restoring the back yard and shrubbery
will cost $20,000, but the market value of your property was lowered by
just $2000. You are devastated and want nothing but to have your back
yard restored to its original condition. Obtaining general damages
equal to the cost of restoration would seem fair, and in almost any court
in the United States you would be entitled to such recovery.
However, imagine the same situation, but instead of ornamental
shrubs, the truck destroyed unattractive yet hard to replace bushes.
Furthermore, you never liked the house much anyway and were
planning to move. You would appear to have hit the jackpot to the tune
of $18,000. If you were to receive an award of general damages equal to
the cost of restoration you then could sell the property for $2000 less
than its pre-tort market value (i.e., its current market value), pocket the
award of damages, and end up with an $18,000 windfall.
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acknowledgment of the plaintiff’s subjective valuation of his land is
appropriate, the burden placed on plaintiffs to convince juries that they
possess an exceptional reason requiring the grant of restoration damages
is unsatisfying: it creates the possibility that many plaintiffs who do wish
to restore their properties but may not have enough evidence of their
intention will fail to be made “whole” by a fair market value damages
award.
There are two understandable reasons for courts’ reluctance to
award disproportionate restoration damages: (1) the desire to prevent
economic waste and (2) the desire to prevent windfalls for plaintiffs who
will not restore their properties.148 The problem with a focus on
preventing economic waste is the presumption that any damages award
larger than the diminution of a property’s fair market value is wasteful.
But the assumption that the market provides the best estimate of a
property’s value is often false—especially in the context of residences or
land kept for reasons besides investment.149 That the landowner could
sell the land without trees for a similar price should not obfuscate the
fact that the landowner can no longer use their property to enjoy the
trees—the purpose for which the landowner purchased the property.
These landowners acknowledge an intrinsic value to trees that the
market does not capture. Thus, without a damages award to restore the
trees’ intrinsic value, defendants’ timber trespass leads to a complete
loss of that value—itself a great waste.
In Wiersum, the court believed that the large restoration award was
wasteful, even though it was within the three experts’ spectrum of
estimated restoration costs. But wasteful to whom? To the plaintiff in
Wiersum, the damages award was not wasteful at all—it was the amount
necessary to return the land to the condition in which it was useful to
him as a nature retreat. Thus, “economic waste” is an inappropriate
focus for courts because the major purpose of damages awards is to
make the injured plaintiff “whole,” which requires an orientation
toward the individual plaintiff’s valuation of their property.150 What
renders the plaintiff “whole” varies from case to case; therefore,
diminution in fair market value of land does not always serve as a
sufficient proxy for how much the plaintiff has lost.
The second great concern of courts surrounding disproportionate
148. Id. at 706.
149. See id. at 702–03 (noting when courts diverge from fair market value in
coming to the “best” estimate of a property’s value).
150. See United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958) (“The
fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured party, as nearly as
possible, to the position he would have been in had it not been for the wrong of
the other party.”).
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restoration damages is the potential windfall to plaintiffs who will not
use the award to actually restore their properties. Undoubtedly, courts
should be concerned with preventing windfalls to landowners with no
intention of restoring trees on their land. But requiring landowners to
prove that they have a sufficient “reason personal” and that the
restoration damages will be used to restore the land is an even greater
problem because it creates a greater obstacle for plaintiffs to be made
“whole.” What evidence could a landowner present to prove that their
attachment to his property ensures he will restore the land? In Wiersum,
the plaintiff’s long ownership and visitation of the property was a
significant factor, yet his “contract” was ruled inadmissible on appeal.
And the trial court in Chung refused to credit the plaintiff’s testimony
that she loved to use her property as a nature retreat and was saddened
by the loss of trees.
Even if the plaintiff is able to convince the court or jury about his
intentions to restore the property, the court may still reject a restoration
damages award as unreasonable because the award is
disproportionately large compared to either the land’s diminution of fair
market value or the property’s pre-trespass value. Such ceilings on
restoration damages awards, like the ceiling based on the property’s
pre-trespass value suggested by Justice Fabe in Wiersum, are not ideal
solutions to the problems of “economic waste” and potential windfalls.
Some jurisdictions have adopted similar damages ceilings that cap a
restoration damages recovery to the amount of the property’s
diminution in value, limiting the plaintiff’s ability to restore their
property even more than the ceiling suggested by Chief Justice Fabe.151

151. James R. Cox, Reforming the Law Applicable to the Award of Restoration
Damages as a Remedy for Environmental Torts, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 777, 789
(2003).

ARTICLE 4 - DIEHR (DO NOT DELETE)

2016

6/14/2016 2:03 PM

CUTTING DAMAGES IN TIMBER TRESPASS CASES 121

Other courts have noted the negative ramifications of damages
ceilings:
Such ceilings on recovery not only seem unduly mechanical but
also seem wrong from the point of view of reasonable
compensation. If the plaintiff wishes to use the damaged
property, not sell it, repair or restoration at the expense of the
defendant is the only remedy that affords full compensation
. . . . [Also,] [t]o hold that appellant is without remedy merely
because the value of the land has not been diminished, would
be to decide that by the wrongful act of another, an owner of
land may be compelled to accept a change in the physical
condition of his property, or else perform the work of
restoration at his own expense.152
Thus, in a jurisdiction with a diminution in fair market value
damages ceiling, even a defendant who intentionally cut down a
plaintiff’s trees to better his own view against the plaintiff’s will would
only have to pay the plaintiff nominal damages if the destruction of
trees does not lower the property’s fair market value. Such a defendant
would be unjustly enriched by his enhanced view while the plaintiff
would have to use his own money to replant any trees. This result is a
windfall for the defendant, and is economically wasteful because it
forces the plaintiff to absorb costs that never would have been realized if
not for the defendant’s wrongful conduct. If there must be a risk of a
windfall or “economic waste” in determining damages awards, should
not the defendant bear that risk?

IV. PROPOSED CHANGE TO DAMAGES DETERMINATIONS
A.

Allow Plaintiffs to Choose the Method for Damages Calculations

Because landowners often purchase properties based on the land’s
subjective desirability, which may include the privacy or immersion in
nature that forested land provides, restoration damages are often a
better measure of the injury suffered by landowners when their trees are
destroyed. Moreover, a system that grants restoration damages can still
avoid the dangers of windfalls to landowners who do not intend to
restore their property.
This Note proposes to allow plaintiffs to recover restoration
damages, even if they are disproportionate to the diminution of the

152. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans v. Louisiana
Gas Servicing Co., 618 So. 2d 874, 877 (La. 1993) (internal quotations omitted).
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land’s fair market value, if they agree to use the damages award to
actually restore the property. The landowners could sign an agreement
stipulating that he will actually restore his land with restoration
damages, like the one made by the plaintiff in Wiersum. But rather than
using this agreement to influence the fact finder as to the plaintiff’s
sincerity, the agreement would be legally enforceable as an actual
contract with either the court or the defendant.153
Admittedly, this suggestion would create some administrative
difficulties. The courts would have to track how plaintiffs who chose
restoration damages spend the award to ensure compliance with the
restoration agreement. One option would be to keep the funds in a
constructive trust or an escrow account so that the dispersal of funds
could be monitored.154 This approach would have the added benefit of
potentially minimizing the restoration damages that are paid out—any
funds left over in the account after a reasonable restoration of the
property has been made could be returned to the defendants.155 If the
courts did not have the duty of checking on plaintiffs’ restoration of the
land, then perhaps that burden could fall to the defendant, just as one
member of a contract must bring a breach of contract claim against the
other.
Additionally, an exception to the statutorily mandated treble
damages could be made for restoration damages. Thus, a landowner
could choose to recover three times the diminution in his land’s fair
market value or the amount required to restore the lost trees on the land.
Under this scheme, a landowner who lacks the motivation to restore the
land would be more likely to choose the treble damages award. Only
landowners who do have personal reasons to restore their land would
forego the treble damages award in order to restore their trees.
Moreover, by abolishing treble damages for restoration damage
awards, there would be a significant reduction in potential “economic

153. Others have suggested that the award of restoration damages should be
predicated upon one’s use to restore the land. In the mineral rights context, for
instance, “[t]o ensure [the land’s restoration], the landowner should be required
to use the monetary award for actual costs of restoration.” Brian Pollock, Note,
Pillaging the Land: Consideration of Judicial Control of Damage Awards to Prevent
Windfalls at the Expense of the Environment, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 419, 421
(2009).
154. See Cox, supra note 151, at 802–03 (noting that, in the environmental
contamination context, courts that award restoration damages may need to
create constructive trusts to ensure that the plaintiff actually restores the
property).
155. “Court supervision of this award will also allow for a more accurate
award of the actual cost of restoring the property to its pre-injury status.”
Pollock, supra note 153, at 421.
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waste.” For example, in the Wiersum case, plaintiff was awarded
$161,000 in restoration damages, which would come to a total of
$483,000 after trebling. If the Alaska Supreme Court had embraced
Justice Fabe’s proposed ceiling based on the land’s pre-trespass value,
then plaintiff’s total recovery would have been $120,000—treble the
$40,000 value of the property estimated by defendants’ real estate
expert. When comparing the proposed $120,000 damages award’s
ceiling to a $161,000 restoration, non-treble damages award, the
damages are close enough in value to avoid the appearance of
significant “waste.”
B.

Public Policy Benefits of Restoration Damages

As discussed earlier,156 the Pacific Northwest benefits significantly
from its swaths of old-growth forests. People who purchase highly
forested land, especially those who build residences on that land, value
these trees—the plaintiffs in both Wiersum and Chung testified that the
beauty of the trees and natural surroundings motivated their property
purchases. Thus, maintaining a timber trespass statute that lessens the
burden on plaintiffs who are trying to restore the natural beauty of their
property is good public policy for Alaska because it best enables its
citizens to be made whole following injurious trespasses. Alaskan
forests possess great aesthetic and environmental value that is not
always best quantified by the land’s market price.157
Of course, maintaining economic efficiency is also a concern of the
state, but a more liberal system of restoration damages is not antithetical
to that interest. Removing the statutory multiplier where plaintiffs
request restoration damages and requiring plaintiff landowners to use
their restoration damages to actually replace lost trees would keep
damages awards lower and ensure that those funds are put to the best
use—restoring the natural beauty of Alaska and giving landowners back
the aesthetic enjoyment that was unlawfully taken from them. By letting
plaintiffs pursue either restoration or diminution in fair market value
damages, Alaskan courts would be taking into account the significant
aesthetic and emotional attachment that many of the state’s citizens have
for their properties.

156. Supra Section I.C.
157. “Economic value, while useful and relatively easy to calculate, does not
adequately capture a forest’s worth.” Charles Riordan, Note, Calming the Fire:
How a Negligence Standard and Broad Cost-Recovery Can Help Restore National
Forests After Wildfires, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 233, 264 (2014).
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CONCLUSION
Timber trespass cases like Wiersum v. Harder and Chung v. Park
exemplify the difficulty of crafting appropriate remedies where damage
to real property has occurred. These cases reveal the inherent tension
between the legal system’s dual imperatives to make plaintiffs “whole,”
even taking the landowners’ idiosyncrasies into account, but also to
prevent unduly punitive damages awards that could undermine
citizens’ trust in the legal system and may burden defendants
disproportionately to their fault.
While harm to defendants is concerning, the current method by
which Alaskan courts approach restoration damages treats plaintiffs
with too much suspicion regarding their desire for restoration and too
much doubt regarding the reasonableness of restoration damages, even
when numerous experts have testified to the restoration costs. This Note
suggests that plaintiffs should have the option of pursuing either
restoration damages, with which they will be legally bound to restore
the property and which will not receive a statutory multiplier, or
damages based on the diminution in the fair market value of the
property, which may be trebled. Plaintiffs who do possess a genuine
“reason personal” to restore the land will opt for the stricter restoration
damages while plaintiffs less attached to their properties will accept the
fair market value damages. Thus, the court will not place the burden of
proof on plaintiffs to convince judges and juries how much they love
their properties; but, rather, allow plaintiffs to sort themselves
appropriately based on their priorities.

